Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Walter Anderson v. Arthur Hardman dba Hardman
Auto Sales et al : Brief of Defendant and Appellant
Arthur Hardman
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Hanson & Baldwin; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant Arthur Hardman;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Anderson v. Hardman, No. 8580 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2692

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.UNIVERSITY UTAH

OCT 31 1957
LAW llBR.AlrG

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UT~.

I L E })
.I~V\' 1 {) \957

WALTER ANDERSON,
.-,-------------"--·::--~~- ·ut-f~i:·
\erk. Supr etne
\...Our '
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba HARDMAN AUTO SALES, NATHAN
CHILD and BARRUS M 0 T 0 R
COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
ARTHUR HARDMAN

HANSON & BALDWIN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Arthur Hardman

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUBJECT INDEX
Page

NATURE OF THE CASE______________________________________________________________

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS______________________________________________________________

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS__________________________________________________________

5

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

POINT I. THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS
NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR
SERVANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
BY SUBMITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY WHICH
WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
BY FAILING AND REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE
JURY THE DEFENDANT HARDMAN~ THEORY
OF THE CASE ________________________________________________________________________ 30
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Bates vs. Simpson (Utah), 239 P. 2d 749, 121 Utah 165 ____________ 25
Bingham City, et al. vs. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah
390, 243 P. 113--------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Coleman vs. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 124 Atl. 224 ____________________________ 26
Davis v. Semloh Hotel, Inc., 86 Utah 318, 44 P. 2d 689 ____________ 12
Derrick vs. Sa'lt Lake & Ogden Ry. Co., 50 Utah 573, 168
P. 335 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
Dowsett vs. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P. 2d 809______________________

8

Fox vs. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d 1049 ________________________ 7, 25
Foxley vs. Gallagher, 55 Utah 298, 185

~-

77 ____________________________ 24

Galarowicz vs. Ward, 230 P. 2d 576, 119 Utah 61L __________________ 28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX CONTINUED
PAGE

Heaston v. Martinez, 3 Utah 2d 259, 282 P. 2d 833 __________ 17
Jackson vs. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235---------------------------- 14
Jensen vs. Utah Ry., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349 ____________________________ 36
Jones v. C. I. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P. 896 ________________________ 10, 17
Knold vs. Rio Grande Western Ry., 21 Utah 379, 60 P. 102L __ 36
Oberhansley vs Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P. 2d 1093,
----------------Utah -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. _2d 834 ____________________ 35

TEXTS
31 A.L.R. (2) 1445---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
Restatement of the Law of Agency, Vol. 1, Sec.

!____________________

7

Restatement of the Law of Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 220________________ 5
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, Sec. 491_ ___________________ 26
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 41-1-72-------------------------------- 13
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 41-1-77-------------------------------- 17
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sections 60-2-2 and 60-2-3____________ 9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
\V ALTER ANDERSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba HARD~IAN AFTO SALES, NATHAN
CHILD and BARRUS M 0 T 0 R
CO:.\IPANY,

Defendants and Appellant..:;,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
ARTHUR HARDMAN

NATURE OF THE CASE
On December 20, 1955, Nathan Child was driving
a 1951 International Pickup truck east on Highway 40,
approximately ten miles west of Salt Lake City when
the vehicle suddenly veered from the south side of the
highway to the north side where it collided with an
automobile driven by one George Williams in which
the plaintiff was riding, resulting in severe injuries to
plaintiff and Child.
The plaintiff sought to recover damages against
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Nathan Child, Arthur Hardman, dba Hardman Auto
Sales, and Barrus l\1:otor Company. The suit was brought
against Hardman as a defendant upon the theory that
Child was his servant or agent and against Barrus
Motor Company upon the theory that the .steering aparatus and the wheels of the vehicle were in a defective
condition, which the Barrus l\fotor Company knew or
should have known.
1
The allegations of negligence were denied by all
three defendants. Hardman also denied that Child was
his agent or servant. A jury returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants Hardman
and Child in the sum of $5,632.00.
This appeal is taken by the defendant Hardman
upon the grounds that there was no evidence to go to
the jury on the issue of whether Child was his servant
or agent and that his motion for a directed verdict of
No Cause of Action made at the close of the evidence
should have been granted. Defendant Hardman also contends that the court erroneously gave certain instructions and refused to give others.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The defendant Arthur Hardn1an is a resident of
Sunset, Utah, where he operated a garage and used
car lot (R. 91). The defendant Child had known Hardman for s01ne time before December 20, 1955 (the date
of the accident). They had done busine.ss together in
the past.
Some wf'ekfi before Dece1nber 20th Child informed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Hardman that he was interested in buying a used pickup truck (R. 83). Sometime after, and a few days before
December 20th, Hardman told Child that he thought he
had located a pickup in Tooele, Utah, which might interest him. Arrangements were made for Child to accompany Hardman on a trip to Tooele in order that he could
see the vehicle (R. 83). They traveled to Tooele in Hardman's wrecker. Child paid no part of the trip expense
(R. 84). Arrived at Barrus Motor Company .at about
10:00 o'clock A.M. (R. 96). The vehicle they were interested in was not there when they first arrived but was
returned to Barrus Motor Company about one hour
later.
Child was interested in the vehicle and in order to
ascertain its mechanical condition Hardman and Child
both drove it (R. 97). They noticed that the window
was defective, the speedometer did not work and that
the oil pressure was low. There may have been one
or two other minor defects (R. 98). Hardman noticed
nothing unusual in the steering mechanism or the way
the vehicle drove (R. 97). Child s.aid that he would take
the truck if the defects which they noticed were repaired
(R. 84 and 98), which was done by Barrus Motor to
Child's satisfaction (R. 90 and 98).
The purchase price agreed on by Hardman and Child
was $650.00 plus the turn-in value of Child's '41 truck
(R. 86, 87 .and 94). Hardman would not have purchased
the truck from Barrus Motor if Child hadn't told him
that he would buy it from him as Hardman didn't want
to pay property tax on it, which would have been due

3
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.January 1, 1956 (R. 85 and 94). Hardman paid Barrus
Motor $600.00 for the pickup (R. 92). They delivered
to him the Certificate of Title, a Bill of Sale and a
receipt for the $600.00 payment (R. 92 and 93) but not
the Registration Certificate (R. 95) which they were
unable to locate. These documents were not delivered
by Hardrnan to Child, which would have been done when
they returned to Sunset (R. 93 and 99). Other than the
paper work the deal between Child and Hardman was
completed verbally before they left Tooele on the return
trip (R. 94).
When the~· were ready to leave Tooele Hardman
delivered possession of the pickup to Child (R. 95).
Child said that he would follow Hardman in the pickup
truck and Hardman suggested that they occasionally
pass each other on the ·way back so that if either had
trouble the other would know about it (R. 87 and 208).
Child put Hardman's Dealer's License Plates on the
pickup truck before they left Tooele (R. 91). After
leaving Tooele on the return trip Hardn1an stopped
at Mills Junction to check the cables on the Yehicle he
w.as towing (R. :205). Child stopped behind him. After
resu1ning the trip Child had passed Hardman once, and
had passed hiln the second tinw when the accident
happened (R. 209. 217 -:219).
Hardn1an did not purrhase the gasoline for the
pickup truck (R. -J-l.t ). nor did he pay or .agree to pay
Child any eompensation.

4
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STA':PE~[]~XT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS NOT DRIVlNG SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS BY SUBMITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY WHICH WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND BY FAILING AND REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDANT
HARDMAN'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN.

If liability is to be irnposed upon Hardman because
of the negligence of Child it rnust be upon some theory
under which Hardman exercised the control or had the
right to control the manner in which Child drove the
vehicle. Plaintiff alleges in his cornplaint that Child
was the servant or agent of Hardman.
Considering first whether the relationship was
master and servant, the Restatement of the Law of
Agency, Yolume 1, Section 220 defines a servant as
follows:
'' (1) A servant is a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who,
with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's
control or right to control."
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There was certainly no evidence that Child was
employed by Hardman. He was paid no compensation
for traveling to Tooele or driving the pickup truck on
the return trip. In the recent case of Oberhansley 'VS.
Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P. 2d 1093, ____________ Utah
____________________ , one of the questions involved was whether
Oberhansley was the employee of one Pearce, for whom
he was driving a car to Evanston, Wyoming from Ogden.
Pearce had given him $10.00 for traveling expense. The
former testified at the trial that if he had seen Oberhansley driving the car in the manner which might
result in damage to it, he felt that he could tell him
not to do so inasmuch as the car was his responsibility.
In holding that the relationship 'Yas not master and
servant this court quoted from the decision of Bingham
City, et al. vs. Industrial Commission, 66 rtah 390, 24:3
P. 113, on page 393, as follows:
"The usual test by which to determine whether
one person is another's employe is whether the
alleged employer possesses the power to control
the other per.son in respect to the services performed by the latter and the power to discharge
him for disobedience or misconduct. Under the
Workmen's Compensation ~\ct it is also essential
that some consideration be in fact paid or payable
to the employe. The purpose of the act is to provide compensation for earning power lost in industry, and the only basi.s for computing compensation is the earning ability of the muploye in
the particular e1nployment out of which the loss
arises. In short, the term 'en1ploye' indicates a
person hired to work for wa~es as the employer
may direct ... ''

6
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The evidence is even more clear in this ca.se that
Child was not the employee or servant of Hardman.
\Vas the relationship between Hardman and Child
that of principal and agent J? Agency is defined in the
Restatement of the Law of Agency, Vol. 1, Section l,
as follows:
"(1) Agency is the relationship which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the
other so to act.
"(2) The one for whom action is to be taken
is the principal.
"(3) The one who is to act is the agent."
In the case of Fox vs. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56
P. 2d 1049, Justice \Volfe said:
"The test of whether one is the agent of the
other depends upon the right of control of one
over the other. The same principles of .agency
apply to the running of an automobile as apply
to any other field of action. The fact that the
automobile is capable of causing so much damage
has led the court, sometimes unwillingly, to depart from the fundamental principles of principal
and agent in order to hold owners responsible,
the thought in the minds of the court being that
more responsibility should be visited upon the
owner of such an instrument because of the
potentialities of mischief."

** * **
"Many cases have loosely used such expressions such as 'for and on behalf,' or 'in the business of,' or 'for the benefit of.' As stated before,
the inquiry must be directed to the question of

7
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agency in the operation of the car rather than
to the question of agency for the accomplishment
of some ultimate purpose."
In the case of Dowsett vs. Dowsett, 116 rtah 12
207 P. 2d 809, a boy in the Army reque_sted his father'
and mother to bring his car to him, and the other was
injured in an accident while the father was driving the
car to the army camp \vhere the boy was stationed. The
mother subsequently brought an action against the boy
upon the theory that the father was the agent or servant of the defendant.
"* * * 'An agent u.Jw is not subject to control
as to the manner in u.Jz iclz he performs the acts
that constitute the execution of his agency is in
a similar relation to the principal as to such
conduct as one who agrees only to accomplish
mere physical results. For the purpose of determining liability, they are both 'independent contractors' and do not cause the person for whom
the enterprise is undertaken to be responsible
* * *.' (Emphasis ours.)
"If respondent had no right of control over
the driver of his car, the court did not err in
directing a verdict of no cause of action. ~\.s
shown above, a principal cannot be held responsible for the torts of his agent where he has no
right of control over that agent.··
One of the factors to he considered in detennining
whether liardn1an had any right of control oyer the
pickup i~ whether he wa~ the owner of the vehicle, or
to Rtate it othPrwi~P. \\·hether there had been a sale of
the vehicle to Child.
Tn this in~tmwe Wf' ar<' dealing with a sp{\cific piece
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of property, that is, a pickup automobile. All of the
repairs to the automobile had been made, that is, the
automobile had been put in a deliverable state (R. 84,
90, 98) and the purchase price had been agreed upon
(R. 86-88). Except for the necessary paper work and
the actual payrnent of the purchase price, everything
that was agreed to be done had been done and the transaction was cmnplete (R. 94-95, 98). Hardman did not
want to buy the pickup truck from Barrus unless Child
would take it, as he had no market for it, and didn't
want to pay the property tax which would be levied on
the vehicle on January 1, 1956 ( R. 84-85, 94). This being
the case, ownership of the specific property had passed
from Hardman to the defendant, X athan Child, prior
to the time the parties left Tooele. Sections 60-2-2 and
60-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to the transfer of property and title so far as those sections are
applicable to this situation provide:
"60-2-2. Property and specific goods passes
when parties so intend. ( 1) Where there is .a
contract to sell specific or ascertained good.s, the
property in them is transferred to the buyer .at
such time as the parties to the contract intend
it to be transferred.
"(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the
intention of the parties, regard shall be had to
the terms of the contract, the conduct of the
parties, usages of trade and the circumstances
of the case.
"60-2-3. Rules for ascertaining intention.Unless a different intention appears, the following are rules for ascertaining the intention
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of the parties as to the time at which the property
and the goods is to pass to the buyer;
"Rule (1) Where there is an unconditional
contract to sell specific goods in a deliverable
state, the property in the goods passes to the
buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or the
time of delivery, or both, is postponed.
"Rule ( 4) • • •
(b) Where in pursuance of a contract to
sell the seller delivers the goods to the buyer,
or to a carrier or other bailee (whether named
by the buyer or not) for the purpo.se of transmission to or holding for the buyer, he is presumed to have unconditionally appropriated the
goods to the contract, except in cases provided
for in the next rule and in Section 60-2-4. (Rule
5 and Section 60-2-4 not applicable). * * *"

In Jones v. C. I. Trust. 64 rtah 151. 228 P. 896,
Jones owned a Chandler car. He left it with the XaylorW oodruff Motor Company with authority given the
Motor Company to sell it for $1,500.00. There was a
Cleveland car, the only one of its kind then on the floor
of the Motor Con1pany showroom. Jones and his son
inspected the Cleveland ear and declared they would
buy it if the Chandler car could be sold for the price
named, and the l\1:otor Company was authorized, in the
event of the sale of the Chandler car, to apply the purchase price on the price of the Cleveland car and Jones
was to pay in addition the su1n of $375.00. Says the
court:
" A sale involves a present transfer of the

10
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title in the goods from the seller to the buyer.
A contract to sell implies that the titlP. in the
goods remains vested in the seller and is to be
transferred to the buyer at some future time.
\Vhether a contract is one of sale or an executory
contr.act to sell depends always upon what the
parties to it intend in regard to the time when
the title in the property is to go to the buyer.
If they intend the title to be transferred when
the contract is made, it is a contract of sale;
otherwise it is a contract to sell. The intention
of the parties is the important and controlling
fact to be considered and given effect in determining the nature of ,a contract in this regard.
There may be a sale, a present passing of the
title, notwithstanding that hy the terms of the
agreement the right to the possession of the thing
sold is retained by the seller until the purchase
price is paid. The intention must be determined
from a consideration of the nature and terms
of the contract, usages of trade, the conduct of
the parties and the circumstances of the case.
If no contrary intention appears from such a
consideration, then the law presumes, u:here the
contract pertains to a specific chattel, in a delivP rable state, that the parties intend the title to
pass when the contract is made, and this is true
regardless of the fact that payment of the price
or delivery of the goods, or both, be postponed.
The foregoing propositions are elementary.
They are to be found in the provisions of the
1Jniform Sales Act, Comp. Laws of Utah, 1917,
ss. 5110, 5127, 5128, Rule 1 (citing ca~P~.)

* * *
"The parties to the contract now under consideration seem not to have expressed any intention whatever in regard to when the title in the
new Cleveland sedan should vest in Jones. They
lt
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say nothing about that matter in the conversation
on the morning of October 8th, nor in any of
the correspondence which passed between them.
Jones agreed, in effect, that he would buy the
new sedan and pay $1875.00 for it, if and when
the sales company sold his old car for $1500.00
net to him, the proceeds of the .sale to that amount
to apply upon the price of the new car, and that
he would pay the balance of $375.00 when he
took possession of the new car. Both parties
understood and intended that the sales company
should retain the right to the possession of the
sedan until the entire purchase price was paid.
The company did sell the old car for more than
the amount which Jones asked for it and received
the money, so that Jones, as a result of that transaction, in fact paid $1500.00 which is all that
he claims in this action, toward the price of the
new sedan. To all intents and purposes, the situation was then the same as if Jones had stepped
into the sales company's office and handed over
$1500.00 in money as a part paYJ.nent on the
automobile, then on exhibition in the showroom,
and said that he would return within a few days
and pa~T the balance of $375.00 and take the new
car.''
In the ra~e of Da ris r. Semloh Hotel, Inc .. 86 rtah
318, -t-t P. (:2) 689, an e1nployer agreed to repurchase
s01ne shares of stock in the eYent the e1nployee was
discharged fr01n his e1nployn1ent. Say~ the Court:
"Under the terms of the contract, whether
or not the property in the stock passed to the
buyer, the defendant was bound by his contract
to repurehase and pay for the stork. The appellant having refused to pay for the stork according
to the term~ of the eonb~act, the seller had the
1:2
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right to maintain his action for the agreed price.
The transaction did not contemplate an option
on the part of the defendant to repurchase the
stock, nor did it constitute what might be determined an offer to purchase the stock. It w.as a
binding contract upon both parties subject only
to a condition subsequent, viz., the discharge of
the plaintiff from the employment contemplated
in the contract. Thi.s condition subsequent having
been fulfilled in the discharge of the plaintiff
and the plaintiff having made tender of the stock,
there would seem to be no good reason why he
should not recover. It 1ras the clear intention of
the parties that the title to the stock should pass
to the defendant upon the happening of the events
as outlined upon which the defendant became
bound to pay."
The evidence of a present sale and transfer of the
title to the property is even stronger in this case than
in the two preceding cases referred to for the reason
that there was no condition subsequent upon which the
title to the automobile should pass, such as the sale of
another automobile or the discharge of an employee,
but rather it was intended by the parties that the ownership should pass at the time possession was surrendered
which occurred prior to the time the parties left Tooele
and before thi.s accident occurred. It may be anticipated
that the plaintiff will contend that no present transfer
of the possession of the automobile was made at the
time the automobile was delivered in view of Section
41-1-72, Utah Code Annotated, which provides that title
to an automobile shall be deemed not to have passed
until the title is transferred in accordance with the re1~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quirements of the motor vehicle law. This argument
is met by the case of Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41,
89 P. ( 2) 235. In that case, T. F. Jackson was the registered owner of a Dodge car, wh1ch Alice C. Jackson
f•laimed was given to her by T. F. Jackson as a wedding
present. There was no transfer of the ownership certificate by the State Tax Commission and, therefore, defendant, the adminstrator of J ackson'.s Estate, claimed that
Alice was not the O"\\-ller of the car in the absence of
such a transfer. He therefore refused to deliver the
car to her. The court rejected this contention and declared:
"But, argues appellant, even though the evidence shows a gift of the car to the plaintiff,
yet the gift is void in law because the ownership
registration was not. transferred in the office of
the State Tax Commission. In support of this
proposition they cite Section 71, Chapter 46, Laws
of Utah 1935, and the case of Schwartz v. \Yhite,
80 Utah 150, 13 P. (2) 643. Appellant however,
misconstrues both the effect of the statute and
the import of the decision. The statute cited
reads:
"'Section 71:
"'Until the department shall haYe issued such
new certificate of registration and certificate of
ownership, deliYery of any vehicle required to
be registered .shall be deen1ed not to haYe passed,
and said intended transfer shall be dee1ned to
be incomplete and not to be valid or effective
for any purpose except as provided in Section
76 of the Act.· Be it noted that the section does
not .apply to all vehieles, but only to those ref!Uirerl to hP rPp;istererl. Ry Rertion 19, before a
1-t
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motor vehicle can be driven upon a public highway, it must be registered. By Section 61, the
transfer or assignment of title to a car autoInatically terminates the registration. Section 63
provides that the transferee of title to a car,
before operating such vehicle on a highway shall
secure a new registration of title, thus recognizing that he gets the title without transfer of
registration. Section 66 further supports this view
and section 67 contains this significant provision:

" 'F pon .any such transfer a new owner may
either secure a new registration and certificate
of title on proper application, upon presentation
of s~tch instntments or documents of authority
or certified copies thereof as may be sufficient
or required by law to evidence or effect a transfer of the title or interest in or to chattels. In
such case, where such new owner, upon transferring his title or interest to another person shall
execute and acknowledge an assignment and
warranty of title and deliver the same, .also the
documents of authority or certified copies thereof as ma)~ be sufficient required by law to evidence the right of such person, to the person to
whom such transfer is made.'
"Section 69 provides for transfer of registration in certain cases by affidavit. It seen1s
therefore that Section 71 is not to be construed,
as contended by appellant, as absolute and mandatory to pass a title. In the light of the whole
chapter, it is evident that its provisions were
written to protect innocent purchasers and third
parties frorn fraud, but was not intended to be
controlling as between the parties to the transaction. It may well be doubted that the Legislature
could make mandatory any such formalities as

]5
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a prerequisite to transfer of title as betweeJJ
the parties. It can, of course, pre.scribe such ruleE
to be effective as to third parties and it may
perhaps provide that the registered title shall
be an element in determining liability for damages resulting from the operation of the car as
indicated by Section 76.
'
"Let us now devote a few minutes to a more
particular analysis of Section 71, the section
upon which appellant relies. It will be noted
from the italicized portion of the section quoted,
supra, that the title shall be deemed to be incomplete. These provisions are not absolute, mandatory or controlling in their application. They do
not confer or deny substantive rights. They are
procedural or evidentiary in nature. They provide
a flag of warning to prospective trasferees or
encumbrancers, much as do the registery acts
relative to real estate or chattel mortgages. Such
was the effect given the statute in Schwartz Y.
White, 80 Utah 150, 30 P. (2) 643."
So it is seen that the fact that certificate of title
was not delivered to Child at the time the possession
df the auton1obile was turned over to hi1n is not important or detern1inative of whether or not ownership
of the vehicle passed for the reason that the statute
was not intended to prescribe the tinw ownership should
pass between the parties. but rather to protect third
parties, who relying upon public records Inight seek to
purchase the autmnobile.
The following citation eontains the intin1ation that
the Legislature n1ight provide that the registration title
shall be an elen1en t in detennining lia hili ty frmu dan1ages
resulting frmn the operation of the car. This intiination

16
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stems from what is now Section -U-1-77, which reads:
"The owner of a motor vehicle who has
made a bona fide sale or transfer of his title or
interest and who has delivered possession of such
vehicle and certificate of registration and certificate of title thereto properly endorsed to the
purchaser or transferee, shall not be liable for
any damages thereafter resulting from the negligent operation of such vehicle by another.''
It will be noted that the statute does not declare
that if there is no physical transfer of the title papers
to the buyer, the seller will be liable for the negligence
of the buyer; it merely .states that if the car has been
delivered to the buyer and with it the certificate of
registration .and certificate of title properly endorsed,
the seller is no longer liable for damages to the buyer
(even though no new certificate has been issued to the
buyer). It is submitted that this supports the position
which we have taken herein that the actual tr.ansfer
of title by the State Tax Commission is not a prerequisite
to the passing of title. This statute was probably .adopted
from California which has an "ownership liability law,"
providing that the owner of a vehicle is liable for injury
or damage up to the sum of $5,000.00, resulting from
the negligence of another in driving the automobile. It
was designed to relieve the vendor from the liability
imposed by this statute, which has not been adopted in
Utah. This position and the holding of Jones v. C. I.
Trust Company, supra, was reaffirmed in the latter
case of Heaston v. Martinez, 3 Utah (2) 259, 282 P.
(2) 833, where our court again recognizes that the
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delivery of the certificate of title properly endorsed
is not essential to a valid sale of an automobile. In
that case wholesale automobile dealers in New :Mexico
and Colorado sold automobiles to a licensed used automobile dealer in Utah, who gave drafts to the wholesale
dealers and foreign certificates of title showing the
wholesale dealers to be the owners were attached to
the drafts as security, and the used automobile dealer ;
transported the automobile to his used automobile lot
and sold them in the usual course of business for a
valuable consideration, without ever having paid the
drafts and without receiving certificate of title. It was
held that the wholesale dealers were estopped to assert
their title to the automobiles in replevin actions against
the purchaser. The plaintiffs in that case relied upon
the same section, now Section 41-1-72, but the Supreme
Court held that the section was not applicable and that
the buyers from the used car lot dealer secured a valid
title.
We anticipate that plaintiff will contend that Hardman attempted to exercise control over the n1anner in
which Child drove the vehicle because of statements
before leaving Tooele to the effect that they should
pass one .another occasionally on the return trip, so
that if either had trouble the other would be apprised
of it.
The first witnef'f'. l\Ir. Child, who was ealled by
plaintiff's counsel under Rule 43 (b). testified in that
examination as fo1lows:
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"Q. You and he talked about the trip going
back, is that right~ I me.an, while you were there
in Tooele, you talked about going back to Sunset"?
"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Were you going to stop in Salt

Lake~

"A. There was nothing mentioned of stopping
at Salt Lake.

"Q. Did he say that you could drive the pickup~

****
"Q. Was there any conversation .about who
was to drive the pick-up~
"A. I was to drive the pick-up and he was to
drive his wrecker truck.
Q. Who was present at the time that was
said~

"A. Well, nobody but Mr. Hardman and I,
that I c.an remember of.

"Q. And who said it; did he say it or did you~
"A. Well, he says, 'You drive the pick-up,
and I'll drive the other truck.'

"Q. And the 'other truck,' did that have also
-that had a jeep attached to it that he was
taking up to Sunset~
"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And did he .also say to you that he
thought that wha;t you should do was to keep
passing each other so both of you would know
that each of you was all right, and your car
was all right~
"A. Yes, sir." (R. 80-81)
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On cross-examination of Child by defendant Hardman's counsel, he testified as follows:
"Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Hardman
that you would follow him in the pick-up truck~
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you recall him saying, in substance,
that, generally, on those trips, you would pass
each other, so, if there was anything wrong with
either car, the other one would know about it¥

"A. Yes, sir." (R. 87)
Hardman testified on cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel as follows:
"Q. As I understand it, before you had left
the place down there at Barrus ~fotor Company
in Tooele, you agreed you would keep in contact
with each other as you go along the highway?

"A. No, sir.
"Q. Hadn't you told Mr. Child that you would
continue passing one another, so that you would
know that you were all right?

"A. No, sir; I suggested that we did that at
times.
"Q. Well, then, did you say to him, 'That
is what we will do' Y

"A. No, sir.
"Q. Well, did you have a conversation with
him about that subject Y

"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Where?

"A. Before we started.
20
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"Q. Who was present~
"A. That, I couldn't .answer.
"Q. What was said~
"A. I suggested we pas.s one another occasionally- or that we did pass one another occasionally when we were out on trips of this order.
"Q. And did you say anything .about stopping
at the junction there between the road that goes
to Grantsville and Tooele~
"A. Not that I recall." (R. 208)
There is nothing inconsistant in the foregoing testimony with Child's ownership and control of the pickup
truck It is significant that when Hardman did not give
.any instructions to Child about stopping at :Mills J unction (R. 208) Childs stopped behind him of his own
volition and not in compliance with a signal from Hardman (R. 82). While they were stopped Hardman did
not examine the vehicle Child was driving (R. 209).
Nor did he talk to Child about the route they would
follow on the return trip (R. 213). Hardman checked
to see if the cables on the vehicle he w.as towing were
in order while at Mills Junction (R. 205). Hardman
did not purchase the gasoline for the pickup (R. 414).
In common every day experience, when persons are
driving separate vehicles some distance to a common
destination, it is not unusual for them to keep in touch
with each other .as a precautionary measure so that
one can assist the other if the need arises. However,
such an arrangement does not necessarily mean that
either has the right to control the manner in which the
other drives his particular vehicle.
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The evidence seems clear that there was a completed transfer of the International Pickup to Child
from Hardman hefore the accident, and because of that
sale Hardman had no right of control over the automobile, nor did he attempt to exercise control over the
manner in which Child drove it. That bv reason thereof
.
'
there can be no imputation of any negligence on the part
of Child to Hardman, however, anticipating arguments ·
of Court, let us assume that the sale was not complete
when Hardman and Child left Tooele, and that Child's
category wa~ that of a prospective purchaser of the
pickup. In this connection it should be noted that Child
at the time of the accident had exclusive possession
and control of the vehicle. This being true, the general
rule as announced in an annotation on the dealer's
liability for the negligent operation of a car by a prospective purchaser found at 31 A. L. R. (2) 1-!-15 applies.
That general rule is announced as follows:
~
"Two basic rules regarding the liability of
an automobile dealer for the negligent operation
by a pro.spective purchaser, or one acting for
hiln, of .a car owned by the dealer, appear immediately fron1 the n1ost cursory inspection of
the cases. The first of these is that the dealer
is not liable if the negligent operation occurs
while the purchaser~ or the person acting in his
stead, is driving the car unaccon1panied by the
dealer or anY representatiYe of the dealer. In
such cases, it. is generally said that the relationship of 1naster and serYant or principal and agent
does not exist between the dealer .and the driver.
The relationship is said to be, instead. one of
bailment, with resulting applicability of the rule
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that a bailor (i.e., the dealer) is not liable for
the negligence of his bailee (i.e., the prospective
purchaser). As stated by one court, when .a prospective purchaser 'accepts the use of a car in
such circumstances, he acts solely for his own
benefit. His object is to satisfy himself as to
the quality of the car in which he is interested.
He is no more the agent of the seller than is
the man who tests the weight of .a piece of goods
the agent of his tailor or the man who thumps
a melon the agent of the grocer. In each case
the test may result indirectly in benefiting the
seller, but this benefit is merely a coincidence
entirely· unrelated to the purpose of the tester.' "
This rule appears to be generally .accepted and
rs supported by case~ cited from a substantial number
(seventeen) of states.
It may be assumed that plaintiff will argue that
Hardman .and Child were engaged in a joint venture
and, therefore, the negligence of Child may be imputed
to Hardman. They are expected to assert that the two
parties had a common destination and Hardn1an w.as
the owner of the vehicle.

In the case of Derrick rs. Salt Lake & Ogden Ry.
Co., 50 Utah· 573, 168 P. 335, the plaintiff brought an
action against the defendant railway company for personal injuries resulting from a crossing accident. The
undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff and the owner
of the autornohile had agreed upon a trip in which they
were to share expenses equally. This court in holding
that it w.as error to instruct that plaintiff was a passenger because he was a joint adventurer said:
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"* * * The una·1sputea ev1·aence sh ows that
the a_utomobile trip was a joint affair in which
~erntt and plaintiff were mutually and equally
Interested, and in which their rights to direct
and govern the conduct of each other in relation
thereto were coextensive. Each had a voice and
the right to be heard in regard to the details of
the trip. Merritt testified that 'the arrangements
were equal; that is, they were mutual among us
all.' He further testified : 'When we started we
had agreed to take lots of time and not drive fast.
We discussed this on the way out,' and that 'it
was clearly understood' that each would pay his
share of the expenses of the trip. Plaintiff testified that costs of the trip included gasoline, oil,
tires, 'wear and tear on the car, and other expenses connected with the trip.'
"The contractural relations of plaintiff and
his traveling companions were substantially the
same as they would have been if they jointly .
hired an automobile with which to make the trip,
with the understanding that they would jointly
pay the expenses and Inutually and concurrently
direct the journey and the details thereof. The
trip was therefore a joint enterprise in which
these parties had a connnunity of interest and
in which they all equally had a voice and a right
to be heard respecting the details of the journey.
Under these circuinstances the negligence of Merritt in the n1anage1nent of the automobile at the
time of the collision was iiuputed to plaintiff.''
See also- tlw eat:'e of Fo.rlcy rs. Gallagher~ 55 rtah 298,
185 P. 77, in whieh it was held that a joint enterprise
between the driYcr and tht:" occupants of the car did
not exist for the reason ·that the occupants had nothing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

whatever to do with the control or management of the
auton1obile.
The basis for a joint venture existing between parties
is contractual and for the driving of an automobile
to be part of the venture, the automobile must be used
in furtherance of the business objective provided for
in the contractual arrangement.
This Court in the case of Bates vs. Simpson, (Utah)
239 P. 2d 749, 121 Utah 165, which involved the question
of whether two used car dealers who shared a lot, the
building thereon and its furnishings and the use of the
telephone were joint adventurers, s.aid:

"* * * We have frequently announced in this
court that 'joint adventure is in the nature of
partnership,' Wasatch Livestock Loan Co. v.
Lewis & Sharp, 8-l Utah 347, 35 P. 2d 835; Kaumans v. White Star G.as & Oil Co., 92 Utah 24,
63 P. 2d 231. To establish a joint adventure there
must be an agreement, express or implied, for
the sharing of profits, 30 Am. Jur. p. 682."
This rule is applicable to this situation. The £act
that an automobile accident is involved should make
no difference.
The case of Fox vs. Lavender, supra, involved an
action brought against a wife riding in an automobile
owned by the husband and wife for injuries arising out
of an accident which occurred while the automobile was
being driven by the husband on an errand for the wife.
Even under those facts the court held that the question
of whether or not the wife was responsible was for the
injury, and in so holding said "That the fact that the
25
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wife was a joint owner, or the fact that the husband
and wife had a common destination, did not in and of
itself make it a joint venture."
The fact that Child and Hardman were not in joint
possession of the automobile at the time of the accident
is important in determining whether Hardman had the
right to control the vehicle. Judge \Volfe in the Fox vs.
Lavender opinion makes some further interesting eomments on the law of joint venture. He quotes from Coleman vs. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 12-1 Atl. 224:
"What sort of an arrangement will make
the parties to it joint adventurers in the operation
of a vehicle in which all are riding is well settled.
A typical case is where two or more jointly hire
a vehicle for their common purpose and agree
that one of their number shall drive it. In such
a case the possession of the vehicle is joint and
each has an equal right to control its operation.
The better considered cases hold that sueh common possession and common right of control, resulting in common responsibility for negligent
failure to control are the earmarks of the legal
relation of a joint adventure in the operation of
a vehicle."
·
The Restatenzeut of the Law of Torts, Yol. 2, Sec.
491, states the effect of joint enterprise on contributory
negligence a:-; follows :
"AnY one of several persons engaged in an
enterprise is barred from reroYery against a negligent defendant by the contributory negligence of
any other of them if the enterprise is so far joint
that each me1nber of the group is responsible to
the third person injured by the negligence of
fellow members."

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Could it be contended reasonably that if the defendLt Hardman had collided with the automobile in which
.e plaintiff was riding, that the defendant Child would
tve joint liability with Hardman for the operation of
le latter's vehicle~ The situation as shown by the evimce seems to compel a negative answer.

The transaction between Hardman and Child was
)mplete before they left Tooele. The only further inter;t which Hardman had in the matter was to obtain
[s money from Child when they reached Sunset. The
efendant Hardn1an had no control or right to control
1e actions of the defendant Child who had purchased
1e vehicle and was therefore the owner in possession
f the same with the full right to control it. He was not
n employee of Hardman and Hardman had no right
> direct his activities. It is true they had agreed on a
)mmon destination, but this fact alone does not give
Lse to any relationship of principal and agent. Even
~it is assumed the sale was not complete and that Hardtan was still the owner of the vehicle, he would not
e responsible for the actions of Child, either as a prosective purchaser or on some theory of joint venture,
s the liability in either of these situations requires the
hysical presence of the owner of the vehicle in the
ehicle being driven. Otherwise, the right of control
ver the actions of the person driving the automobile
ecomes a meaningless thing for the reason that the
wner is in no position to exercise that right. It is true
1at in the case of master and servant the actions of
1e servant are those of the master even though the
27
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Inaster Inay not be present at the time the acts are p€rforrned, provided the servant is acting within the scope:
of his employment. This principle of law is not appli- ·.
cable to the situation of bailor and bailee, which is actu- ,
ally the relationship which existed here if the sale between Child and Hardman was not complete before
commencing their return trip to Sunset.
The case of Galarowicz vs. Ward, 230 P. 2d 576,
119 rtah 611, again affirms the rule of the earlier Utah
decisions that the ownership of an automobile by one
person and use by another raises no presumption of
agency even though the use is by members of the same
family as the owner. Says the court:

"* * * Plaintiff asks that we reconsider the
rule as it now exists in this state, that ownership
of an automobile b~~ one person and use by another raises no presumption of agency. In this
regard, his counsel review for us the cases developing the rule and solicit its abrogation. See
Ferguson v. \Yinter, -!6 l 1 tah 321. 150 P. 299;
McFarlane v. \Yinters, -!7 Ftah 598, 155 P. 437,
L.R.A. 1916D, 618; Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Ptah
583, 176 P. 267 and Saltas v. ~lffleck, 99 Ftah 65,
102 P. 2d 493, for cases developing this rule. The
principle has been considered even 1nore recently
however, in the ease of Conklin v. \Yalsh. 1948,
113 rtah 27G. 193 P. ~d -!37. -!-!0.
''In this latter case, Dr. Conklin sued \Yalsh
for damag-es to his aut01nobile arising out of a,.
collision he tween the \Yalsh car and the Conklin]
car, being driven by ~Irs. Conklin. The trial court
directed a verdict for the plaintiff and held that
l\1 rs. Conklin waf' not the agent or servant of
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her husband and therefore her negligence was
not imputable to him. The court said: 'That there
is no presumption of agency between husband
.and wife in the operation of an automobile merely
because of the marriage relationship has been
fully decided by this court in the case of Fox v.
Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d 1049 (1053),
109 A.L.R. 105.' The court then quotes from the
Fox v. Lavender opinion, in part, as follows:
'* * * The other line of authorities which hold
that no presumption arises that the driver of the
car is the .agent of the owner where the owner
is not present are found listed in Berry on Automobiles, supra, p. 1172, Sec. 1359, Utah falls
within this class. (citing cases) In this jurisdiction this is the case even- though a me1nber of
the family is driving. * * *' The court, in Conklin
v. Walsh, then concluded: 'The fact that in this
case the wife was in the act of taking the daughter
to her music lesson at the time * * * does not
establish agency between herself and her husband
who was the owner of the car. Since the record
discloses no other evidence of such a relationship,
the trial judge when he determined that Mrs.
Conklin was negligent correctly held that her
negligence w.as not imputable to him.'"

It is submitted that the evidence on the relationship
~tween Hardman and Child was undisputed and the
aestion of whether Hardman was responsible for Child's
egligence was for the court and not for the jury. That
1e plaintiff as a matter of law failed to sustain the
arden of proving that Hardman was the agent or
~rvant of the defendant Child.
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS BY SUBMITTING ISSUES TO THE JURY WHICH WERE NOT 8UPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND BY FAILING AND RE.
FUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDAN'I
HARDMAN'S THEORY OF THE CASE.

Number 19 of the Court's instructions to the jury
reads as follows:
"No liability can be imposed upon defendant,
Arthur Hardman, unless you shall find from a
preponderance of the evidence:
" (a) That, at the time of the accident,
Arthur Hardman was the owner of the pickup
truck;
"(b) That Kathan Child was driving the
truck as an agent or employee of Arthur Hardman, on behalf of and for the benefit of Arthur
Hardman, and not on his own behalf or for purposes of his own;
" (c) That, in operating said truck, the defendant Child was negligent; and
" (d) That such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
"And, if you find from a preponderance of
the evidence earh of the above propositions (a),
(b), (c), and (d), Arthur Hardman would be,
liable to the plaintiff, and you should so find. 1
"But if You do not find each and all of said
four pro~ositions, then Arthur Hardman is not
liable and your verdict should be in favor of defendant, Arthur Hard1nan, and against the plaintiff, 'No Cause of Action.'"
At the rlof'e of the evidence the defendant Hardman
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excepted to this instruction upon the ground th.at there
was no evidence to go to the jury on the issue of
whether Hardman was responsible for the manner in
which Child drove the vehicle or that the relationship
of master and servant or principal and agent existed
between the two. This exception was taken upon the
grounds mentioned in the .argument under Point I (R.
421-422). Defendant further excepted to the instruction
upon the grounds that it permitted the jury to find
whether Hardman was the owner of the pickup truck
without defining for them, either in this instruction or
elsewhere, the meaning of ownership as contemplated
by law. Also, that in sub-paragraph (b) of the instruction the issue of whether or not Child was the agent of
H.ardman, upon the ground that there was no instruction in the finding or informing the jury of his Requested
Instructions, neither of which were given by the court
as requested or in substance even though the court's
notes indicate that No. 6 was "covered another way,"
(R. 31) and No. 6C was "substance given" (R. 35).
Defendant Hardman's Requested Instruction No. 6A,
which re.ads:
"DEFENDANT HARD~1AN'S 'REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 6A
"You are instructed that under the law of
this state title to personal property passes at the
time the parties to the contract intend it to be
transferred and unless a different intention
appears title pas.ses to a purchaser when the contract of purchase is made, and it is immaterial
whether the time of payment or the time of de-
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l~very, or both, is postponed. If therefore, you
f1nd from the evidence that at Tooele, Utah, defertdant Child, after an inspection of the truck
at the Barrus Motor Company place of business,
expressed his satisfaction with it and said he
would buy it and would pay $650 as the purchase:]
price; that is to say, that he would deliver to
Hardman an old car for a credit of $100 and pay
the balance of $500 when the parties returned from
Tooele to Sunset, Davis County; and if you fur-·
ther find that Hardman paid Barrus Motor Company of Tooele for the truck and delivered the
same to Child pursuant to said agreement and
that Child was driving the same at the time of the
accident, then you are instructed that at the time
of the accident Child and not Hardman was the
owner of the car and Hardman was not responsible for its operation and your verdict should
be for defendant Hardman."
sets out the law on the issue of whether the ownership
or title to the autmnobile passed to Child based upon
the defendant Hardn1an 's theory of the rase even though
the evidence disclosed the purchase price "·as $650 plus
Child's old ear, $150 of which would haYe heen payable
in 90 da~·~ (R. ~()-~1).
The defendant Arthur H ard1nan requested the court
to instrnrt the jury on the control factor in Instruction
No. fi, wh ieh re.ads:
.. INSTRrCTIOX NO. 6
•· You are instructed that the negligence of a
driver of an autmnobile cannot be ilnputed to
another person, except in the case where the
driver is the e1nployee of such person, unless the
other person is present at the time the negligent
acts a rf' con1nli tteed and p.a rtiei pates in or exerC'.ises C'.ontrol over the operation of the auto~2
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mobile or has the right to exercise such control
even though he does not do so. This is true even
if such other person is the owner of the automobile. If you find from the evidence in this case
that the defendant Nathan Child was not an
employee of Arthur Hardman and that prior to
the accident in this case the defendant Hardman
had surrendered the control and custody of the
International pickup truck to the defendant
Nathan Child and that the defendant Arthur
Hardman exercised no control over or had no
right to control the actions of the defendant
Nathan Child, then the defendant Arthur Hardman cannot be held liable for the negligent actions
of Nathan Child.

Requested only if K o. 5 is refused."
and Instruction No. 6C, which reads :
"DEFENDANT HARD~1AN'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 6C
"You are instructed that whether one person
is agent of another depends upon right of control of one over another, and if you find from the
evidence that after delivering the truck to Child
at Tooele Hardman had no control or right of
control over the operation of the vehicle and that
it was not being driven by Child for or on behalf
of Hardman, then you are instructed that Child
was not the agent of Hardman at the time of the
accident and your verdict must be for the defendant Hardman.''
The defendant's Requested Instruction ~ o. 6C ~et~
out the necessity for the element of control for the relationship of principal and agent to exist and No. 6B, which
reads:
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"DEFENDANT HARDMAN'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 6B
"You are instructed that there can be no
liability on the part of defendant Hardman unless
you find that at the time of the accident defendant
Child was the agent of Hardman in operating the
truck. Therefore, if you find that before leaving
Tooele to return to Sunset, Hardman and Child
had agreed upon the price Child was to pay for
the truck and that Child had declared he would
buy it, and if you further find that Hardman
paid Barrus Motor Company for the truck .and
then delivered it to Child, who had agreed to pay
for the truck upon arrival at Sunset, Davis
County; and if you further find that the accident
occurred while Child was driving the truck on
the return trip to Sunset, then you are instructed
that in operating said truck Child was not the
agent of Hardman, and your verdict should be
for defendant Hardman."
applies to the evidence in accordance with the defendant
Hardman's theory of the case.
Instruction No. 7A, which reads :
"DEFENDANT HARDl\fAN'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 7A
"You are instructed that where the owner of
a vehicle delivers it to a prospective purchaser
who, unaccompanied by the seller, operates the
same and negligently injures or causes damage to
another person, the seller is not liable for the
negligent act of such prospective purchaser.
Therefore, if you find from the evidence that in
driving the truck from Tooele defendant Child
was merely a prospective purchaser thereof and
34
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that Child was negligent in operating said truck,
and if you further find that he was unaccompanied
by defendant Hardman and that because of Child's
negligence the plaintiff sustained damage, then
you are instructed that such negligence of Child
cannot be imputed to the defendant Hardman
and your verdict should be for said defendant
Hardman."
covers the issue of whether the owner of a vehicle is
liable for the negligence of a prospective purchaser,
which was .an issue for the jury if the sale was not completed between Hardman and Child before they commenced the return trip from Tooele.
A consideration of the Court's Instructions as given
and the failure to give the foregoing Requested Instructions of the defendant Hardman resulted in the jury not
being instructed on his theory of the case.
This matter is controlled by the decision of this
Court in Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834,
which reaffirmed the fundamental principle that it is the
duty of the court to cover the theories of all parties
in his instructions.
The court in his Instruction No. 23 instructed the
jury as follows in the second paragraph thereof:
"In determining the amount of such damages,
you .are instructed that you should consider the
pain and suffering that the plaintiff has endured,
if any, both mental and physical, as a result of
such negligence, ever since he sustained his
injuries, and that he will probably endure in the
future."
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Defendant excepted to the last part of the last sentence
in this paragraph upon the grounds that it was unsupported by the evidence in that there was no evidence
that the plaintiff would experience pain and suffering
in the future (R. 423). In fact, the evidence was to the
effect that he had m.ade a full recovery.
Defendant Hardman also excepted to submitting the
issue of the loss of bodily function in the last paragraph
of said instruction for the same reason. This phrase,
which reads "'loss of bodily function" (R. -1-23--1-2-±), is
crossed out in Instruction 23, but it is defendant's recollection that the instruction was submitted to the jury
in its entirety including the words "loss of bodily function." This instruction is contradictory to Instruction
No. 21B and would certainly confuse a jury inasmuch as
in the latter instruction the jury was told that there
was no evidence that plaintiff had sustained permanent
loss of bodily function. The giving of contradictory
instructions is error. Knold vs. Rio Grande Trestenz Ry.,
21 Utah 379, 60 P. 1021; Jensen vs. rtalz Ry., 72 rtah
366, 270 P. 349.
Defendant also excepted to the Court's Instruction
No. 14 relating to the issue on whether or not the defendant Nathan Child was negligent in driving said
pickup when he knew, or should haYe known, there was
some defect in the tire and tubes, upon the grounds
that there was no evidence to support the question of
whether Child knew, or should have known, under the
cirrmnstanees, that said defect existed before the accident
and that considering said instruction in connection with
B6
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Court's Instruction No. 19, the issue is submitted as to
whether Hardman was .also responsible for any knowledge of Child of the defect existing in the truck (R. 421422), and for the same reason Hardman excepted to the
Court's Instruction No. 20 (R. 423).
·
It is often difficult for judges and lawyers to apply
the law to fact situations involving questions of agency
and master and servant, witness the plethora of conflicting decisions on the subjects in the various jurisdictions.
How can a jury of laymen be expected to do so without
adequate instruction on the nature and elements necessary to establish such relationships~

CONCLUSION
The defendant Hardman was not in the pickup truck.
Child had accepted it, .and Hardman's only concern
was in receiving the purchase price or in arrangements for payment when they returned to Sunset.
Therefore, the only theory upon which he could be held
liable for Child's negligence would be under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, which the evidence indisputably
shows did not exist. The purchase price was agreed on
before leaving Tooele and if the transaction is governed
by the intention of Hardman and Child, the sale, other
than payment, was complete at that time, and Hardman
had no right to control the manner in which Child
drove the vehicle. If not, Child's status was that of a
prospective purchaser, and a bailee. However, the law
in this state does not extend liability to an owner who
does not have the right of control during the trip,
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although he is interested in arrival at the ultimate
destination. If we are correct in this proposition, error
in the instruction is moot, in any event there is nothing
further to add to our contentions that the instructions
were erroneous.
We respectfully submit that the verdict in this case
should be set aside and a judgment of K o Cause of Action
entered in favor of the defendant Arthur Hardman, or in
the alternative, that he be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON & BALDWIN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Arthur Hardman
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